JUDICIAL POPULISM AND EXECUTIVE OVERREACH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN SOUTH ASIA (2020–2025)

Abstract

This research offers a comparative analysis of judicial populism and executive overreach in South Asia's constitutional courts between 2020 and 2025, with a focus on India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. In a decade marked by rising populist leadership and democratic erosion, courts across the region have faced increasing institutional pressure—either to restrain executive power or to accommodate majoritarian agendas under constitutional pretexts. The study highlights how these courts have varied in their response, shaped by political context, judicial traditions, and legal cultures. The research finds that judicial populism in South Asia is neither uniform nor accidental. India’s Supreme Court, while institutionally independent, has selectively engaged in populist reasoning, particularly in nationalism-linked cases. Pakistan’s judiciary, leveraging its suo motu powers under Article 184(3), has oscillated between activist oversight and quiet acquiescence, especially during the PTI-led and post-PTI hybrid regimes. As of 2025, Pakistan’s Supreme Court has been at the center of controversies over electoral disqualification, military interference, and constitutional interpretation, exposing the blurred lines between accountability and politicization. Bangladesh’s courts, amid a shrinking civic space and continued rule by the Awami League, have struggled to uphold autonomy, especially under the Digital Security Act. Sri Lanka’s judiciary, meanwhile, has navigated shifting legal terrains under the 20th and 21st constitutional amendments, attempting to preserve institutional integrity while confronting presidential overreach. Drawing on landmark rulings, judicial commentary, and comparative constitutional analysis, this study introduces the concept of “strategic judicial populism”—a calculated posture adopted by courts to preserve public legitimacy and institutional relevance while managing internal and external pressures. The paper argues that courts have, at times, facilitated executive consolidation rather than curbed it. To protect constitutionalism, the research recommends reforms in judicial appointments, stricter separation of powers, and institutional safeguards against populist capture.

Keywords: Judicial populism, executive overreach, constitutional courts, South Asia, strategic judicial populism, separation of powers, democratic erosion, judicial activism, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, constitutionalism.