ADAPTING EUROPEAN FEDERALISM/ FEDERAL PRINCIPLES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND SUGGESTED REFORMS)

Abstract

This research explores the potential of adapting European federal principles to guide constitutional reforms in India and Pakistan, two South Asian states with divergent yet comparable federal structures. While India functions under a quasi-federal constitution with strong centralizing tendencies, Pakistan exhibits a more unstable federal system marked by ethnic, provincial, and political tensions. Drawing on the European model particularly the institutional design and subsidiarity principles of the European Union this study offers a comparative analysis of how such frameworks might inspire more balanced federal governance in both countries. By critically examining constitutional provisions, intergovernmental relations, and center-state/province dynamics in India and Pakistan, the paper evaluates their current limitations in accommodating regional aspirations and ensuring democratic decentralization. It further identifies relevant European federal practices that may enhance cooperative federalism, strengthen judicial and institutional safeguards, and improve fiscal and political autonomy of subnational units. The research emphasizes context-sensitive reform proposals, considering historical, political, and socio-cultural realities of the subcontinent. Ultimately, the paper argues that selective adoption of European federal elements could provide viable pathways for deepening democracy and regional stability in India and Pakistan.

Keywords: Federalism, Constitutional Reform, India, Pakistan, European Union Principles.