



Research Consortium Archive

P(ISSN) : 3007-0031

E(ISSN) : 3007-004X

<https://rc-archive.com/index.php/Journal/about>



The current Wave of Insurgency in Baluchistan

Huma gul (Main Author)

Department of Pakistan Studies, Abbottabad University of Science and Technology, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Email: Humakhan7969@gmail.com

Dr. Muhammad Rizwan

Chairman, Department of Pakistan studies, Abbottabad University of science and Technology, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Email: drmuhammadrizwan_hu@yahoo.com

Muqadas Afzal Khan

Department of Pakistan Studies, Abbottabad University of Science and Technology, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Email: muqadaskhan0410@gmail.com

Dr. Muhammad Rizwan (Corresponding Author)

Chairman, Department of Pakistan studies, Abbottabad University of science and Technology, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Email: drmuhammadrizwan_hu@yahoo.com

Publisher : EDUCATION GENIUS SOLUTIONS

Review Type: Double Blind Peer Review

ABSTRACT

Political marginalization and economic exploitation, along with oppression of ethnic nationalism, led to the Balochistan conflict, Pakistan's longest undeclared war. A series of military operations and the denial of the aspirations of the people of Balochistan within the federal structure of Pakistan led to recurrent waves of separatistism since its accession to Pakistan in 1948. The conflict has unfolded in five distinct phases of rebellion, from tribal insurrections to highly organized rebel movements. The geostrategic significance of Balochistan a border with Iran and Afghanistan and a piece of real estate that houses the port of Gwadar as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has escalated the conflict, the regional dimensions of which continue to draw interest from powers such as the United States, India and China. Suicide bombers and massive attacks have become rampant over the years with extremist groups, particularly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and its Jeeyand (BLA-J) segment, to intensify their activities. The BLA-J hijacking of the Jaffar Express in March 2025 was another demonstration of the increasing tactical proficiency of the terrorists as well as of the enduring securitization deficit in Pakistan. This work argues that the Baloch uprising isn't simply a localized revolt; it's a complex form of war with historical roots, intense state repression, economic exploitation, and factors related to its geographical location. A durable solution over the long term can only be achieved through political accommodation, economic justice and regional cooperation.

Keywords: Baluchistan Conflict, Political Marginalization; Economic Exploitation, Baluch Liberation Army (BLA), China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Introduction

Bard O'Neill states that an insurgency is not a fast process, it is slow and it's a contest between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which both sides consciously use political resources and violence. Quotes the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources; they are not restricted to such resources. The regime does the same. Each side, whatever its prior designation, is an Insurgent. The struggle is a deliberately selected political means to an end. It is not the end itself. For this reason an Insurgency could not co-exist with an Insurrection. The use of the terms Insurgents or Insurgencies are themselves a formal name for phenomena which can be indigenous. However, one does not get a movement if nothing seems to be organized it may be written that the general public in the area ruled or contested by a smooth operation of power learns by experience that the authorities (and I mean the Establishment) has the necessary strength and brings it to bear, that co-operation with authorities is unlucky at best, more likely fatal. The former government and its opponents are judged by the former government to be Insurgents. An Insurgency is a condition in which there is certainly an increase, and in some situations a great increase, in the Violent-Speed of Politics. It is not an increase in violence, but an increase in the amount of physical-granit of the complete number of violent actions in a region. The Chileans (1964-) train in Arizona with US and Brazilian armies Source: (1970) Insurgency Guide Subversion via violence, of either an economic or a literary kind, is part of conventional and guerrilla warfare, to wit official or insurrectionist regimes which all parties concerned acknowledge as legitimate in general the adherents of a legitimate government are slow to take advantage of insurgent organization. In long-term, low-intensity informal political warfare the break point is the start of any significant insurrections, not the day an insurgency is declared Peace

is the absence of war, it is not the absence of successful violent political action. The US and France used to be in world politics Iraq, and many other places in the Africa/Arabia world colonial powers. The Game: What would a procedure for the control of a region by non-military' forces look like. It might be an uprising it might not. In the long run, the suppression of all forms of insurgency represent the prime method of settling disputes in countries an outstanding feature of power and its developments is the highest possible standard of personal reaction, a reaction in which political sentiment was never illegal Iraqi is regarded today as no more than a locus of systematic massive destruction of the enemy. They had to sign a treaty, in view of their legal entanglement with Iraq (and the general hostility raised against their occupation of that country by the World Community) to quit Iraq and re-declare war in a couple of years. It is considered an article of contemporary influence on America person, but it is topical around the retained entities, It is that quantity of Political Violence greater than required to absorb unifying the military effort. Contact if you have obtained a party's effective control of an area (although it might be mostly rubble and detainees) you must provide a reasonable police to maintain order. It may also be defined as a political movement that uses subversion and terrorism to achieve its aims, which include the overthrow of the existing government". Such descriptions are the measure of the hell they are going through to quench the bleeding in Balochistan, because Unlike many fights born in Pakistan, an insurgency in Balochsitan is only revolved that long. Balochistan has been ripe for separation ever since other administrative units joined its current composition after 1948. (Saleem,2019)

Balochistan is Pakistan's largest province. Balochistan's total area is 347,190 square km, which is 43.6 per cent of Pakistan's total area. Geographically, Balochistan has two highlands: the lower highland and the upper highland. The history of Balochistan began even before the Stone Age. It is the largest province of Pakistan but still the most underdeveloped. Baluchistan has been ignored for six decades. There are no primary schools, and the infrastructure is quite terrible. The clash between the Baluchis and the Pakistanis is not over. Five major wars have devastated the history of Balochistan. The Balochisn need an economic life line, and they need it now. Approximately 70% of Baloch population is forced to live below the poverty line. Balochistan is the largest of Pakistan's four provinces, constituting approximately 44 percent of the country's total land mass. n fact, this province exchanges over one third of its natural gas in energy equivalent with another province in the country and owns significant natural resources like gas, coal, gold, oil, aluminum, silver and the like.(Beg, 2019).

The Indian Ocean through Balochistan Balochistan also has a strategic value since it is the gateway to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. It is bordered by Iran and Afghanistan. It links South and Central Asia through Gwadar. So to speak, infect Gwadar's geostrategic benefits and economic relation with China also made this town the hotbed in the region. It also defines and frames the front lines of the region's enduring war on terror. It is one of few places across the whole area of the Baloch and Pashtuns' clusters. But, it has also been place of residence for settler Balochistan people since Pakistan's creation. Five military operations have been initiated by the Pakistani Army since independence. In the aftermath of Nawab Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugatti's final rebellion, there was a fresh wave of uprisings in the province. The word "insurgency" is a definition of just that, organized rebellion or violence meant to protest against the government taking control of an area politically. As indicated above, both political and insurgent factions have employed violent fighting in order to attain economic and political control of the province, but one faction does

not have a vested interest in the insurgency while the others have mixed interests with other organizations. The Federation and the militant Balochistan have had the worst relationship since the former's independence. The confederation, on the other hand, would remain beholden to the authority of the Khan of Kalat, who in 1948 was subjected to the government's first military operation, and whom the government accused of blocking the confederation's accession. Another military coup took place in 1958 against Nawab Nawroz Khan who declared a war against one unit. The state had united four West Pakistan provinces into one and had termed east Pakistan as a province which became intolerable for him and his supporters, whom he had been pushed into a guerilla action against the state. 1963 saw the third military operation going in, with intent to establish military bases in the troubled districts of the province. Sher Mohammed Murri decided to take the law in his own hands and initiated a guerilla revolt against the province. The fourth armed resistance began when Mr Bhutto dismissed the elected government of Balochistan. Nawab Khair Baksh Marri formed the Balochistan People's Liberation Front to fight a guerrilla war against the central government. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was assassinated during the province's fifth military operation. The Baloch nationalists' recent actions had once more put the federation on the backfoot. The most controversial were military missions against nationalist tribal leaders which turned their struggles into a violent separatist struggle. Tanner, (2019).

In history, Balochistan is no stranger to blood-soaked insurgencies. This rather routine insurgency had a historical root in an ongoing conflict of Baloch masses with the Pakistani federation. These links also became acrimonious with resource appropriation and the comings and goings of Pakistani interaction. Nor has the Balochistan insurgency been fundamentally fuelled by domestic issues. Rather, those discussions have been shaped by a variety of geopolitical tools and projects that are driven and supported by various regional and global players. The region's borders with Iran, Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea caught the eye of many actors. The region has become a hotspot in the global war against terrorism and extremism, which the west has been waging since the 9/11 attacks. (Bansal, 2008). Key players say the US, China and India all pursue assertive foreign policies with regional interests. Their investment in the flourishing insurgency is essentially a bid for power-sharing and profit-maximization. It is also home to a number of jihadist outfits, among them the Taliban. (Jilani & Mujaddid, 2020).

Baloch Liberation Army Jeeyand (BLA-J) BLA-J is the currently the most active Baloch insurgent organization. The claimed attacks steadily increased, from 50 in 2019 to 64 in 2020 and 88 in 2021. ⁷⁴ The usage of fidayees was promised to be only once a year. But since early 2022, BLA-J appears to have significantly scaled up its activities, launching 188 attacks in 2022, 247 in 2023 and 302 in 2024. ⁷⁵ The number of suicide attacks has also grown and BLA-J has reported three in 2022, two in 2023 and a high of six in 2024.

The March 2025 hijacking of the Jaffar Express by the Baloch Liberation Army-Jeeyand division (BLAJ) represented a marked escalation in the ongoing Baloch insurgency, revealing both the insurgents' growing operational capabilities and Pakistan's continued security challenges. (" Al Jazeera, March 11, 2025). On March 11¹⁶, BLA-J militants blew up the Bolan Pass road, halted the passenger train running from Quetta to Peshawar, abducted the passengers (consisting mostly of security personnel who were on leave and were traveling back to their homes from Balochistan), and demanded the release of Baloch political prisoners. The number of passengers on board at the time of the attack varies between sources, official and

unofficial, but over 400 people were said to have been on the train. DG ISPR, Dawn, March 14, 2025.

The militants claimed to have let people off the train and had held 214 off-duty security personnel hostages for over 48 hours before an operation, "Operation Green Bolan", which resulted in the killing of all 33 BLA-J militants involved. (Hakkal via Telegram, March 14, 2025). Pakistan claimed to have freed 354 hostages, but 30 people, 26 passengers and four rescuers, died during the operation. (Reuters, March 13, 2025) Conflicting accounts of the number of passengers, hostages and victims taken by the militants and the GOP contributed to the impression that there is insufficient transparency about the attack, further aggravating the kind of resentments among the local population that has left the province paralyzed by political crisis. The attack It was from a security standpoint that the strike showcased the capability of the insurgency in Pakistan, in taking the drive against the national infrastructure, its separatist objective, and the exposure of the vulnerabilities of the internal security of Pakistan.

Directions to War

The strategic importance of Balochistan made it a focal point for both British and Russian empires. During the truce, actors divide the territory between them. The UK and India along with Iran and Afghanistan conquered part of Balochistan, and reform their borders. Both empires turned a blind eye to the potential revolt, in order to exploit that wealth and manpower. (Heathcoat, 2015) Pakistan obtained independence from undivided India in 1947 a province of the then British Empire. In the partition of the Indian subcontinent, 565 princely states were asked to opt for the princely state (Pakistan or India) to which the state was geographically contiguous and had the same religion. (Political Integration of India". 2019)

1947 Balochistan was divided into the parts such as Chief Commissioner province (directly controlled by the British Empire), Princely states (Kalat, Kharan, Lasbela, Makran), Gwadar (governed by Oman) while Princely states of Kharan, Lasbela, and Makran acceded to Pakistan in 1952 and Kalat acceded in 1955. (Westminster Research, 2019).

When Khan of Kalat signed the deed of accession in July 1948, his brother Prince Abdul Karim launched a revolt. Prince thought of waging a war against Pakistan and took refuge in Afghanistan. But in 1950 he opted to capitulate to Pakistan and end this bizarre war. He fought his war all by himself because Balochistan did not stand by him. Jinnah and his loyalists were able to maintain his title until the province's dissolution in 1955. Between 1958 to 1959, a policy of one unit was introduced with the effect that few Tribal Chiefs were represented. Nawab Nauroz Khan opposed this policy and he raised a revolt against the government. He and his friends embarked on a guerilla war against Pakistan. This has been followed by two wars with the Pakistan state as embodied in the one-unit scheme of the 1956 constitution with a separatist movement since 1960. Sher Muhammad Bijrani was a guerrilla leader in the Guerrilla war of 1963–1969 and made his strongholds of 72000 kilometers. The hostility of the earlier encounters continued to fester to even as late as 1970, when the government opted for direct military intervention in Balochistan in 1973. This year Prime Minister Bhutto dismissed the interim government of Balochistan. This led to a war between the government and the Marri & Mengal tribes. In 2004, militants assaulted Gwadar port, killing three Chinese engineers and wounding four. In 2005, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugatti and Mir Balch Marri put a 15-point agenda, including provincial resources and stopping the construction of military bases. In 2006, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugatti,

79, was killed by the Pakistani army in a clash which claimed the lives of 60 Pakistani soldiers and seven from the other side. But that was balanced with a rocket attack on President Pervez Musharraf. In August 2009, a Khan of Kalat announced sovereignty of Balochistan, and said he was Khan of Pakistani Balochistan, not Afghani Balochistan. (Khattak, et al 2022)

Baloch Nationalism

Baloch nationalism is a nationalist political and cultural movement which claims that the Baloch people, an ethno-linguistic group mainly found in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, constitute a nation separate from that of the majority of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The nationalist spectrum supports Muslims are not a monolithic entity (a direct antithesis of the idea that led to the creation of Pakistan) and ethnic loyalties are more important than religious obligations, this has been a contentious stance always. The Baloch nationalist movement's demand has ranged from greater cultural, economic and political autonomy to political secession and the formation of an independent state in Balochistan. This movement is secular and broadly motivated by a leftist Marxist philosophy, along the same lines of other parts of Pakistan. Nationalist trends are underway in Balochistan, which are permeating all sectors of government policies and behaviour. Politically, the question of interim autonomy and political autarky in terms of the 1973 Constitution. Each, even nationalists of various varieties and colors, are certainly having trouble. It is a sociological term, which is being misunderstood in Pakistan, but in sociology it is known as an evolutionary process in Balochistan. (Nabeel, 2017).

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)

Is an armed Baloch nationalist independence movement which is spearheading an insurgency against Pakistani government for greater provincial rights, particularly concerning a greater share of revenue and resources. The movement seeks complete freedom from Pakistan and remains focused on preventing foreign exploitation or incursion into Balochistan. The BLA also aims at establishing Greater Balochistan comprising Pakistan's Balochistan, Iran's Sistine-Baluchistan and Afghanistan's Balochistan province. The outfit has regularly demanded a better infrastructure for Balochistan. It has requested the Islamabad government to halt the "exploitation" of the Balochi resources and to compensate Haq and develop Balochistan. While the party states that it was founded in 2000, many media sources and analysts consider it to be a revival of one of the old separatist movements (Independent Baluchistan Movement 1973/77) but, it must be noted that the BLA is the oldest as well as the deadliest of all groups that have been active in Balochistan. Though the BLA is largely composed of the outcast Marri et Bugtis tribes of Baluchistan, however it is estimated and analysed that the BLA might eventually find young nationalist activists. For starters, the BLA emerged in the summer of 2000 in response to increasing discontent in Balochistan at the government's control over the province's natural resources and at the disproportionate allocation of jobs to Punjabi settlers rather than to Baloch civilians. BLA first rose to prominence after taking responsibility for a blast in a Quetta market, the capital of Balochistan. This assault took place alongside the formation of the BLA. Attacks on markets and trains during this period were thenceforth made along lines akin to previous ones, this time, however, to police and security forces. Not much is known of the BLA's operations after 2003 after its establishment. But come May 2003, the BLA intensified its strikes, killing Baloch and non-Baloch civilians and policing officials. And then, in the following year, the BLA

zeroed in on Chinese migrant labor joining government-sponsored mega-development projects. These attacks were carried out in the presence of Pakistani journalists and were intended to show the group's readiness to attack foreigners in order to pressure the Pakistani government. The Pakistani government reacted to the attacks by deploying another 20,000 local paramilitary and additional frontier corpsmen to Baluchistan. Attacks persisted from the region despite the Pakistan Army's heavy deployment. In what was one of its most high-profile actions, in 2005 the group targeted Camp Kohlu where Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf was visiting. Pakistani authorities perceived this as an assassination attempt on the president and had little choice but to designate the BLA a terrorist group in 2006. The same year, two high profile Baloch (relationship to the BLA not quite as determinant) Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti and Mir Baloch Marri were killed in two separate operations by The Security Forces. Public ceasefire In September 2008, the BLA, Balochistan Liberation Front, Baloch Republican Army, and Government of Pakistan announced a ceasefire. This was tried on condition that Pakistani government will resume talks with the three groups and neither party will head in the direction of the case of violence. However, later in 2009, BLA withdrew from the bloc and then on April 15, 2009 during an interview with a Pakistani news channel the assumed leader Brahamdagh Khan Bugti called on the baloch people. The two alleged masters were the most influential men of Balochistan. As the Pakistani Human Rights Commission notes, they might have been "a tactic to provoke further violence on the part of the terrorist organization," that the government can then use as a pretext for further involvement in the province of Balochistan. Around the same time, Pakistan gave China forty years lease of its Gwadar port, situated in South of Baluchistan. The BLA and many Balochi Nation estimates that leasing out of Gwader Port is yet another nefarious attempt of the government to exploit Balochistan and to undermine its sovereignty, and as a result they made the contract document public to surface the Pakistan dirty linen in Baluchistan dirty war. To target as many as possible non-Baloch in Quetta Balochistan. After this interview, Punjabis have been killed on mass scale in Balochistan, but it's not confirmed whether this attack was directly related to the leader's interview. Besides being involved in ethnic cleansing, from 2009-12, the BLA continued its attacks against Pakistani government servants, including military personnel, police personnel, government officers, school teachers. In 2013, ISIL was responsible for an attack at the national monument and historic summerhouse of Pakistan's founder Jinnah. In 2014, alleged BLA commander Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri was said to have died for natural reasons. After Marri's death, his six sons vied for the leadership of the BLA. Three of the sons are believed to have left the BLA to establish the United Baloch Army (UBA). ODS also do not distinguish between the two brothers and we know few further details about who stayed in the BLA and who left with the establishment with the UBA. The two parties have carried out combat on and off the battlefield. On November 3, 2016, the United Baloch Army claimed the BLA is responsible for the murder of one of its commanders Ali Sher and the detention of four of its jacks. The BLA remains engaged in a war with the UBA and also continues to launch attacks against the Pakistani government. On April the 21st 2017, over 500 militants from different banned Baloch militant groups surrendered to Pakistani police, these include the The BLA along with others. This occurred after the government announced a political reconciliation program in the Balochistan province that guaranteed monthly pay, jobs, schooling, and protection for terrorists that surrendered to law enforcement. Qureshi, et al (2025).

In 2018, the group shifted focus by targeting Balochistan and attempting to cleanse it

of Chinese and Pakistani control. Bordering Iran and Afghanistan, Balochistan is rich in resources such as gas and minerals and the Pakistani government, the group claims, is working with foreign countries, such as China, to extract these resources. A top BLA commander also accused China and Pakistan of plundering the natural wealth of the country and committing atrocities against the Baloch in a bid to wipe out their identities. In 2018 the BLA attacked a Chinese consulate in Karachi, shooting up the compound in an effort to create discord between China and Pakistan at the time when new global agreements were being drawn up. They consider it one of their largest and most high-profile attacks in the past few years. Khan, (2022, June 18).

March 11, 2025 A Baloch Liberation Army terrorist organization, a separatist outfit demanding larger autonomy and independence for the Balochistan province, hijacked the Jaffar Express, an important passenger train traveling between Peshawar and Quetta, Pakistan. It occurred close to the troubled area of Balochistan, a stronghold of militant activity for decades, where an ethnic Balochi population has become increasingly angry over what it describes as government neglect. Shortly after it left Quetta, the train was seized by hijackers, whose comrades had exploded the tracks, stopping the nine coaches in a tunnel and taking about 400 passengers, including military and law enforcement agents, hostage. BBC News. (2025, March 13)

BRP (Baloch Republican Party)

Bradman Bugti (grandson of Akbar Bugti) a resident of Switzerland calls it an alien party. After his grandfather's death, he became an implacable foe of the state. Moreover, the BRP is struggling for greater Balochistan, and that has turned into an armed conflict due to the political struggle. He is trying to run his campaign outside, requesting the UN to step in and stop genocide of Baloch tribe. (Saleem, 2019).

The BNM (Baloch National Movement)

Another party which carries on violent military operation to stretch Balochistan is BNM. The armed forces subjugated the Province during the Musharraf's rule, and converted its political struggle into a war. It is also a political party. It was organized by Ghulam Muhammad Baloch, a prominent leader of Baloch resistance to the state. He was killed in 2009, and the army was blamed for a horrible death. Even now, after his death, the UN condemned it. He was slain in 2009. Moreover, a few other nationalistic political parties/movements had a past of fighting with the law enforcement agencies; they are here to be treated under our constitution. (Tanner, 2019).

National Party of Baluchistan

Abdul Malik Baloch: National: Regulated: a nationalist Balochi group that basically claimed to represent the mediocre. They are part of the electoral system but did not participate in the 2008 elections, and unknown gunmen have killed several of its leaders.

BNP (Balochistan National Party)

The BNP, led by Akhtar Mengal, is a strong nationalist party, which held the governorship of the province before 2002 and refused to take part in elections in 2008. He obtained funds from the provincial resources of Balochistan, but until recently he needed nothing more than a general freedom of the province and a military, finance, and currency provided by the Government of India. The government slaughtered members, and now the party is demanding a referendum of self-

determination.

CPEC and the Anti-China Campaign

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), considered as the project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was launched in 2015 with a projected investment of \$62 billion. CPEC, for which, infrastructure, energy production and trade facilities are being built, primarily connects Gwadar Port in Balochistan with China's Xinjiang province through roads, trains and pipelines with a network of highways, railways, and pipelines spread across the length and breadth of Pakistan, providing China with a direct access to the Arabian Sea.

For all its economic potential, the CPEC has intensified the Baloch insurgency over fears in Balochistan of resource capture, marginalization and cultural erosion. The growing complexity and frequency of attacks targeting CPEC-related targets reflects the insurgency's resilience, which could threaten not only regional stability but also project completion if not countered with inclusive development and empathy. Responding to those apparent resentments, Baloch separatist groups have begun a number of operations, now more frequently targeting Chinese people and property, who they consider complicit in exploitation. Anti-China string of deadly suicide bombing and assaults by BLA-J has spearheaded the anti-China agenda. Three of the five stages of Operation Sir Paha Zag have had their sights on Chinese interests and citizens. During Phase III (2023), importantly after threats for China were repeated by BLA-J, a 90-day ultimatum was given to China, that's in the presence of Beijing in Balochistan to be removed or otherwise, the action of technical activities inside China will be intensifies against the Chinese national and Security establishment of Pakistan. (Zahid Hussain,2021-2023)

During Operation Sir Paha Zag, BLAJ also carried out some more lone attacks on Chinese personnel. These encompass the 29 June 2020 suicide bombing perpetrated by the four members of the Majeed Brigade against the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) in Karachi as part of Operation Stock Exchange. Later in April 2022, BLA-J operated on its first female suicide bomber Shari Baloch who executed the assault on the Confucius Institute in Karachi. (Asad Hashim, Al Jazeera, June 29, 2020 There is no tracking data showing how often such orders are followed. One suicide bomber was sent in October 2024 by BLA-J to attack a convoy of Chinese nationals and security personnel in Karachi, which concluded the 2024 attacks on Chinese interests. (BLA units, Majeed Brigade and ZIRAB are responsible for the attack in Karachi. BLF, BLA-A, BRG and SRA Other key Baloch outfits – BLF, BLA-A, BRG and SRA have been conducting mild attacks at a small scale, focusing mainly on CPEC machinery, gas lines, mineral trucks, and project workers. Insurgent tactics appear to have moved from hit-and-run attacks to highly choreographed operations as a wave of hit-and-run strikes is hitting anti-CPEC civilian targets. The escalating severity of such attacks demonstrates rebel tactical competence, as well as resistance to what is seen as economic exploitation. Pakistan has deployed many security personnel to guard the CPEC projects in return, militarizing the area. A heavy-handed response by Pakistan's government to counter the insurgency marked by military operations, and involving summary methods has only deepened Baloch alienation, feeding a sense of political and economic disenfranchisement. (Imran Ahmed,2024)

So rather than crushing the insurgency, these tactics have inflamed local anger, engendering support for the rebels. Pakistan has asked for Chinese help in intelligence sharing and counterinsurgency operations, expanding the role of Beijing in its internal security. This security collaboration can increase Pakistan's strategic dependence on

China, allowing the Chinese to exercise sway over Pakistan's security policy and decision making in some CPEC related fields. (Imtiaz Baloch, 2024) With Baloch militant organizations targeting Chinese interests and people since 2024, (Sergey Sukhankin, July 14, 2023) security cooperation between Pakistan and China has become a new facet (of the corridor's progress), with a greater Chinese involvement in the security domain of the CPEC project, particularly as Phase II gets underway. There are many Chinese workers who are working on the Coal Block power projects under the CPEC in Sindh. (Daily Times, May 9, 2022.)

Conclusion

Baluchistan's conflict is rooted in decades of political exclusion, economic exploitation, and broken assurances of autonomy. From Khan of Kalat's rebellion in 1948 to the ongoing violence by outfit's BLA, BRP, and BNM, the struggle has advanced in phases characterized by grievances about political under-representation, economic exploitations, and distinct linguistic identities. The emergence of nationalist groupings and militant entities exemplify the Baloch people's profound dissatisfaction with what they perceive as an oppressive and extractive state policy. With regards to the state military incursions, they have succeeded, albeit temporarily, in quelling the insurgencies, but they have fostered feelings of alienation. The fact that violence persists, and increasingly takes the shape of targeting infrastructure and security personnel, and foreign initiatives such as the CPEC, suggests that the conflict is far from settled. Long-term peace and stability in Balochistan would instead require a holistic approach that combines political inclusivity, a fair sharing of resources and conceding Baloch identity in Pakistan's federal system.

.References

- Abid Hussein, "Deadly Pakistan train hijack: What happened, who was rescued, what's next?" Al Jazeera, March 11, 2025.
- Asad Hashim, "Pakistan: 4 killed in attack on Karachi stock exchange," Al Jazeera, June 29, 2020.
- "An unlikely profile," Dawn, April 28, 2022.
- Beg, S., Baig, T., & Akbar, M. (2019). Analysis of the Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on the insurgency in Balochi.
- Bansal, A. (2008). Factors leading to insurgency in Balochistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 19(2)182-200.
- BBC News. (2025, March 13). 'Killed in front of our eyes': How the Pakistan train hijacking unfolded. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy0d5y9ew24o>
- "China's Expanding Security Presence in South Asia: Implications for India and the Region," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023; Zahid Hussain, *The New Silk Road: China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Impact on Pakistan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2021)
- "Civil work of Thar Coal Block-1 to complete this year," Daily Times, May 9, 2022
- Dilshad Baloch, "Pakistan's War on Balochistan Has Reached a Point of No Return," *Diplomat*, March 24, 2025.
- Heathcote, T. A. *Balochistan, the British and the Great Game: The Struggle for the Bolan Pass, Gateway to India*. London: Hurst & Company, 2015
- Hong Zhao, *China's Private Security Firms and Their Expanding Role in the Belt and Road Initiative* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).
- Iftikhar Shirazi, "Will take on terrorists, enablers both inside and outside Pakistan:

- DG ISPR,” Dawn, March 14, 2025.
- Imran Ahmed, “The CPEC and its Discontents: Security, Unrest and the Human Cost of Development in Pakistan’s Balochistan,” ISAS, October 17, 2024; “Gwadar Residents Face Relocation Due to Chinese Mega Projects – Dr. Mahrang Baloch,” Balochistan Post, May 12, 2024.
- Imtiaz Baloch, “Pakistan Struggles to Protect Chinese Interests Amidst Consistent Attacks,” Khorasan Diary, October 7, 2024
- “Islamabad denies reports of China deploying its forces in Pakistan to protect its nationals,” Arab News, March 30, 2025.
- Khattak, N. S., Naseer, A., & Gul, A. (2022). History and Evolution of Insurgency in Balochistan (1948 to 2018). *Global Political Review*, 7, 26-33.
- Khan, A. (2022, June 18). Understanding the Baloch Liberation Army by Abdullah Khan. *Narratives Magazine*. Retrieved from <https://narratives.com.pk/horizons/understanding-the-baloch-liberation-army/>
- Nabeel, F. (2017, February 7). Factionalism in the Balochistan Insurgency – An overview. *Stratagem*. http://stratagem.pk/armed_dangerous/factionalism-Balochistan-insurgency-overview/
- “Over 100 Pakistani Forces Personnel in Our Custody,” Hakkal on Telegram, March 11, 2025;
- “All 214 hostages executed, battle still ongoing,” Hakkal on Telegram, March 14, 2025.
- “On 11 March 2025, Jaffar Express, traveling from Quetta to Peshawar was attacked by heavily armed terrorists near Sibi,” ISPR, No PR-88/2025-ISPR, March 12, 2025; Saleem Ahmed and Saad Sayed, “Pakistan military ends train standoff, says 21 hostages and four troops killed,” Reuters, March 13, 2025.
- Sergey Sukhankin, “Chinese PSCs in South Asia: The Case of Pakistan,” Jamestown Foundation, July 14, 2023.
- Political Integration of India". 2019. Cs.Mcgill.Ca. https://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~rwest/wikispeedia/wpcd/wp/p/Political_integration_of_India.htm.
- Qureshi, S., & Alam, Z. (2025). BLA
- Qureshi, S., & Alam, Z. (2025)., Jaffar train incident and Balochistan: Exploring a Rabbit Hole. No, it is just available on Roshni's official website.
- Jilani, S. G., & Mujaddid, G. (2020). Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Case Study of Balochistan. *Global Strategic & Security Studies Review*, 5(1), 1-16.
- Saleem, M. (2019). Insurgency in Balochistan. *Stratagem*, 2(2), 80–95. <http://journal.cscr.pk/stratagem/index.php/stratagem/article/view/49>
- Tanner, T. (2019). Explaining the resilience of the Balochistan insurgency.
- “The Karachi attack was carried out by BLA units, Majeed Brigade, and ZIRAB.”
- Umar Jamal, “Pakistan Turns to Private Sector for CPEC’s Next Phase,” *Diplomat*, September 25, 2024; Umar Jamal, “A Subtle Shift in China’s Approach to Engaging With Pakistan?” *Diplomat*, January 29, 2025.
- Westminster Research <http://Wwww.westminster.ac.uk/Research...> Accessed December 26, 2019. https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/download/e50e6b14a1447e03082205d9c0a4f9648d4665a9389f1b2e24d7f107c2f492e7/2206365/Gulawar_KHAN_2014.pdf